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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) enable innovative
applications of machine learning like image recognition, machine
translation, or malware detection. However, deep learning is
often criticized for its lack of robustness in adversarial settings
(e.g., vulnerability to adversarial inputs) and general inability to
rationalize its predictions. In this work, we exploit the structure
of deep learning to enable new learning-based inference and
decision strategies that achieve desirable properties such as
robustness and interpretability. We take a first step in this
direction and introduce the Deep k-Nearest Neighbors (DkNN).
This hybrid classifier combines the k-nearest neighbors algorithm
with representations of the data learned by each layer of the
DNN: a test input is compared to its neighboring training points
according to the distance that separates them in the represen-
tations. We show the labels of these neighboring points afford
confidence estimates for inputs outside the model’s training man-
ifold, including on malicious inputs like adversarial examples–
and therein provides protections against inputs that are outside
the models understanding. This is because the nearest neighbors
can be used to estimate the nonconformity of, i.e., the lack of
support for, a prediction in the training data. The neighbors
also constitute human-interpretable explanations of predictions.
We evaluate the DkNN algorithm on several datasets, and show
the confidence estimates accurately identify inputs outside the
model, and that the explanations provided by nearest neighbors
are intuitive and useful in understanding model failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning is ubiquitous: deep neural networks achieve
exceptional performance on challenging tasks like machine
translation [1], [2], diagnosing medical conditions such as
diabetic retinopathy [3], [4] or pneumonia [5], malware
detection [6], [7], [8], and classification of images [9], [10].
This success is often attributed in part to developments in
hardware (e.g., GPUs [11] and TPUs [12]) and availability
of large datasets (e.g., ImageNet [13]), but more importantly
also to the architectural design of neural networks and the
remarkable performance of stochastic gradient descent. Indeed,
deep neural networks are designed to learn a hierarchical set of
representations of the input domain [14]. These representations
project the input data in increasingly abstract spaces—or
embeddings—eventually sufficiently abstract for the task to be
solved (e.g., classification) with a linear decision function.
Despite the breakthroughs they have enabled, the adoption
of deep neural networks (DNNs) in security and safety critical
applications remains limited in part because they are often
considered as black-box models whose performance is not
entirely understood and are controlled by a large set of
parameters–modern DNN architectures are often parameterized
with over a million values. This is paradoxical because of
the very nature of deep learning: an essential part of the
design philosophy of DNNs is to learn a modular model
whose components (layers of neurons) are simple in isolation
yet powerful and expressive in combination—thanks to their
orchestration as a composition of non-linear functions [14].
In this paper, we harness this intrinsic modularity of deep
learning to address three well-identified criticisms directly rele-
vant to its security: the lack of reliable confidence estimates [15],
model interpretability [16] and robustness [17]. We introduce
the Deep k-Nearest Neighbors (DkNN) classification algorithm,
which enforces conformity of the predictions made by a DNN
on test inputs with respect to the model’s training data. For
each layer in the DNN, the DkNN performs a nearest neighbor
search to find training points for which the layer’s output is
closest to the layer’s output on the test input of interest. We
then analyze the label of these neighboring training points to
ensure that the intermediate computations performed by each
layer remain conformal with the final model’s prediction.
In adversarial settings, this yields an approach to defense that
differs from prior work in that it addresses the underlying cause
of poor model performance on malicious inputs rather than
attempting to make particular adversarial strategies fail. Rather
than nurturing model integrity by attempting to correctly clas-
sify all legitimate and malicious inputs, we ensure the integrity
of the model by creating a novel characterization of confidence,
called credibility, that spans the hierarchy of representations
within of a DNN: any credible classification must be supported
by evidence from the training data. Conversely, a lack of
credibility indicates that the sample must be ambiguous or
adversarial. Indeed, the large error space of ML models [18]
exposes a large attack surface, which is exploited by attacks
through threat vectors like adversarial examples (see below).
Our evaluation shows that the integrity of the DkNN
classifier is maintained when its prediction is supported by the
underlying training manifold. This support is evaluated as level
of “confidence” in the prediction’s agreement with the nearest
neighbors found at each layer of the model and analyzed with
conformal prediction [19], [20]. Returning to desired properties
of the model; (a) confidence can be viewed as estimating
the distance between the test input and the model’s training
points, (b) interpretability is achieved by finding points on the
training manifold supporting the prediction, and (c) robustness
is achieved when the prediction’s support is consistent across
the layers of the DNN, i.e., prediction has high confidence.
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Fig. 1: Intuition behind the Deep k-Nearest Neighbors (DkNN)—Consider a deep neural network (left), representations
output by each layer (middle) and the nearest neighbors found at each layer in the training data (right). Drawings of pandas
and school buses indicate training points. Confidence is high when there is homogeneity among the nearest neighbors labels
(e.g., here for the unmodified panda image). Interpretability of the outcome of each layer is provided by the nearest neighbors.
Robustness stems from detecting nonconformal predictions from nearest neighbor labels found for out-of-distribution inputs
(e.g., an adversarial panda) across different layers. Representation spaces are high-dimensional but depicted in 2D for clarity.
Intuition for the Deep k-Nearest Neighbors
The intuition behind DkNN is presented in Figure 1.
Discussed below, this gives rise to explorations of the definition
and importance of confidence, interpretability and robustness
and their role in machine learning in adversarial settings.
a) Confidence: There have been recent calls from the
security and ML communities to more precisely calibrate the
confidence of predictions made by DNNs [15]. This is critical
in tasks like pedestrian detection for self-driving cars [21] or
automated diagnosis of medical conditions [22]. Probabilities
output by DNNs are commonly used as a proxy for their
confidence. Yet, these probabilities are not faithful indicators
of model confidence (see Section III-A). A notable counter-
example is the one of adversarial examples, which are often
classified with more “confidence” (per the DNN’s output
probabilities) than their legitimate counterpart, despite the
model prediction being erroneous on these inputs [17], [23].
Furthermore, when a DNN assigns equal probabilities to two
candidate labels (i.e., it has low confidence in either outcomes),
it may do so for at least two different reasons: (a) the DNN has
not analyzed similar inputs during training and is extrapolating,
or (b) the input is ambiguous—perhaps as a result of an
adversary attempting to subvert the system or the sample being
collected with a naturally noisy observation process.
In the DkNN, the number of nearest neighboring training
points whose label does not match the prediction made on a test
input defines an estimate of the input’s nonconformity to the
training data. The larger that number is, the weaker the training
data supports the prediction. To formalize this, we operate in
the framework of conformal prediction [24] and compute both
the confidence and credibility of DkNN predictions. The former
quantifies the likelihood of the prediction being correct given
the training set, while the later characterizes how relevant
the training set is to the prediction. In our experiments (see
Sections V and VII), we find that credibility is able to reliably
identify the lack of support from the training data when
predicting far from the training manifold.
b) Interpretability: This property is the ability to construct
an explanation for model predictions that can be easily
understood by a human observer [25], or put another way to ra-
tionalize DNN predictions based on evidence—and answer the
question: “Why did the model decide that?”. DNN decisions are
difficult to interpret because neurons are arranged in a complex
sequence of computations and the output representation of each
layer is high-dimensional. This limited interpretability inhibits
applications of deep learning in domains like healthcare [5],
where trust in model predictions is key. In contrast, the DkNN
algorithm is more interpretable by design because the nearest
neighbors themselves provide explanations, for individual layer
and overall DNN predictions, that are easily understood by
humans because they lie in the input domain.
c) Robustness: Robustness to input perturbation is another
important requirement for security [26], [27], [28], [29], [30]
and safety [31] in ML systems. While DNNs are robust to
random perturbations of their inputs, they are vulnerable to
small intentional perturbations of their inputs at test time—
known as adversarial examples [17], [23]. This attack vector
allows an adversary to fully control a DNN’s predictions,
even if it has no access to the model’s training data or
internal parameters [32]. Small perturbations introduced by
adversarial examples are able to arbitrarily change the DNN’s
output because they are gradually magnified by non-linearities
successively applied by each layer in the model. Put another
way, when the DNN is misclassifying an input, there is
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necessarily one of its layers that transformed the input’s
representation, which was by definition in the correct class
initially. In contrast, the DkNN classifier prevents this by
identifying changes in the labels of nearest neighboring training
points between lower and higher layers of the DNN as an
indicator that the DNN is mispredicting (see Figure 1). In
essence, the DkNN removes exploitable degrees of freedom
available to adversaries attempting to manipulate the system’s
predictions—thus offering a form of robustness to adversarial
example attacks (see Section VII). Note that this is not simply
an ensemble approach that combines the predictions from
multiple models; our DkNN algorithm inspects the intermediate
computations of a single DNN to ensure its predictions are
conformal with its training data.
Contributions
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• We introduce the Deep k-Nearest Neighbors (DkNN)
algorithm that measures the nonconformity of a prediction
on a test input with the training data as an indirect estimate
of the credibility of the model predictions (see Section IV).
• We empirically validate that predictions made by a DkNN
are more reliable estimates of credibility than a DNN on
naturally occurring out-of-distribution inputs. On inputs
geometrically transformed or from classes not included
in the training data, the DkNN’s credibility measurement
is below 10% versus 20%-50% for a given DNN.
• We demonstrate DkNN interpretability through a study of
racial bias and fairness in a well known DNN (Section VI).
• We show that the DkNN is able to identify adversarial
examples generated using existing algorithms because of
their low credibility (see Section VII). We also show that
adaptive attacks against the DkNN often need to perturb
input semantics to change the DkNN’s prediction.
We find these results encouraging and note that they
highlight the benefit of analyzing confidence, interpretability
and robustness as related properties of a DNN. Here, we
exploit the DNN’s modularity and verify the conformity
of predictions with respect to training data at each layer
of abstraction, and therein ensure that the DNN converges
toward a rational and interpretable output. Interestingly and
as explored in Section VII, Sabour et al. [33] investigated
the vulnerability of internal representations as a vehicle for
creating malicious inputs. This suggests that in addition to
enforcing these properties at the level of the model as a
whole, it is important to defend each abstraction from malicious
manipulation. Indeed the work discussed throughout suggests
that is is not only necessary, but also a useful tool in providing
a potential defense against existing adversarial algorithms.
II. BACKGROUND ON DEEP LEARNING
Machine learning refers to a set of techniques that automate
the analysis of large scale data. In this paper, we consider
classification tasks where ML models are designed to learn
mappings between an input domain and a predefined set of
outputs called classes. For instance, the input domain may be
PDF files and the classes “benign” or “malicious” when the task
of interest is malware detection in PDF documents. Techniques
like support vector machines [34], and more recently deep
learning [35]—revisiting neural networks architectures [36]
are common choices to learn supervised models from data.
In this paper we build on deep neural networks [9] (DNNs).
DNNs are designed to learn hierarchical—and increasingly
abstract—representations of the data. For instance, a neural
network trained to recognize objects when presented with
samples will typically first learn representations of the images
that indicate the presence of various geometric shapes and
colors, compose these to identify subsets of objects before it
reaches its final representation which is the prediction [14].
Specifically, a deep neural network f is a composition of l
parametric functions referred to as layers. Each layer can be
seen as a representation of the input domain. A layer is made
up of neurons—small units that compute one dimension of
the layer’s output. The layer indexed λ (with λ ∈ 0 .. l − 1)
takes as its input the output of previous layer fλ−1 and applies
a non-linear transformation to compute its own output fλ.
The behavior of these non-linearities is controlled through a
set of parameters θλ, which are specific to each layer. These
parameters, also called weights, link the neurons of a given
layer to the neurons of the layer that precedes it. They encode
knowledge extracted by the model from the training data (see
below). Hence, given an input x, a neural network f performs
the following computation to predict its class:
f(θ, x) = fl−1 (θl−1, fl−2 (θl−2, ...f0 (θ0, x))) (1)
When possible, we simplify the notation by omitting the vector
parameters θ = [θ0, ..., θl−1], in which case we write f(x).
During training, the model is presented with a large
collection of known input-output pairs (x, y) ∈ (X,Y ). To
begin, initial values for the weights θ are drawn randomly.
We then take a forward pass through the model: given an
input x ∈ X and label y ∈ Y , we compute its current belief
f(x), which is a vector whose components are the estimated
probability of x belonging to each of the classes: e.g., the 5-th
component f(x)[5] is P (y = 5 | θ, x). The model’s prediction
error is estimated by computing the value of a cost—or loss—
function given the current prediction f(x) and the true label y.
In the backward pass, this error is differentiated with respect
to all of the parameters in θ, and their values are updated to
improve the predictions of neural network f . By iteratively
taking forward and backward passes, values of the model
parameters that (approximately) minimize the loss function on
the training data are found.
The model is then deployed to predict on data unseen during
training. This is the inference phase: the model takes a forward
pass on the new—test—input and outputs a label prediction.
One hopes that the model will generalize to this test data to
infer the true label from the patterns it has encountered in its
training data. This is often but not always the case however, as
evidenced by adversarial examples (see Section III-C below).
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III. ON CONFIDENCE, INTERPRETABILITY & ROBUSTNESS
We systematize knowledge from previous efforts that tackled
the problem of confidence in machine learning. Their strengths
and limitations motivate the choices made in Section IV
to design our approach for measuring confidence in DNNs.
Finally, we position our work among existing literature on
interpretability and robustness in (deep) machine learning.
A. Confidence in Machine Learning
There exist several sources of uncertainty in ML applica-
tions [37]. Observations made to collect the dataset introduce
aleatoric uncertainty by not including all necessary explanatory
variables in the data. For instance, a spam dataset that only
contains email metadata but not their content would introduce
substantial aleatoric uncertainty. In this paper, we focus on
epistemic uncertainty—or model uncertainty—introduced by a
ML model because it is learned from limited data.
Below, we survey approaches for estimating the confidence of
DNNs. The most frequently used, adding a softmax layer to the
DNN, is not reliable for inputs that fall off the model’s training
manifold. Other approaches like Bayesian deep learning remain
computationally expensive. In Section IV, we thus introduce an
approach to provide more reliable model uncertainty estimates.
a) Softmax probabilities: The output of DNNs used for
classification is a vector f(x) that is typically interpreted as
estimates of the model’s confidence for classifying input x in
class j of the task considered. This vector is almost always
obtained by adding a softmax layer that processes the logits—
or class scores—output by the penultimate model layer. Known
as Platt scaling [38], the approach is equivalent to fitting a
logistic regression to the classifier’s class scores:
fl−1(x)[j] =
ezj∑n−1
p=0 zp
(2)
The logits zj = fl−2 · w[j] (i.e., class scores) are originally
floating point values whose values are unbounded, whereas the
output of the softmax is a vector of floating point values that
sum up to 1 and are individually bounded between 0 and 1.
Contrary to the popular belief, this approach is not a reliable
estimator of confidence [39]. Adversarial examples are good
counter-examples to illustrate the weakness of this metric:
they are inputs crafted by adding a perturbation that force
ML models to misclassify inputs that were originally correctly
classified [23], [17]. However, DNNs output a larger confidence
for the wrong class when presented with an adversarial example
than the confidence they assigned to the correct class when
presented with a legitimate input [17]: In other words, the
softmax indicates that the DNN is more confident when it is
mistaken than when its predicts the correct answer.
b) Bayesian approaches: Another popular class of tech-
niques estimate the model uncertainty that deep neural network
architectures introduce because they are learned from limited
data by involving the Bayesian formalism. Bayesian deep learn-
ing introduces a distribution over models or their parameters
(e.g., the weights that link different layers of a DNN) in order to
offer principled uncertainty estimates. Unfortunately, Bayesian
inference remains computationally hard for neural networks.
Hence, different degrees of approximations are made to reduce
the computational overhead [40], [41], [42], [43], including
about the prior that is specified for the parameters of the neural
network. Despite these efforts, it remains difficult to implement
Bayesian neural networks; thus radically different directions
have been proposed recently. They require less modifications to
the learning algorithm. One such proposal is to use dropout at
test time to estimate uncertainty [44]. Dropout was originally
introduced as a regularization technique for training deep neural
networks: for each forward and backward pass pairs (see above
for details), the output of a random subset of neurons is set to
0: i.e., they are dropped [45]. Gal et al. instead proposed to
use dropout at test time and cast it as approximate Bayesian
inference [44]. Because dropout can be seen as an ensembling
method, this approach naturally generalizes to using ensembles
of models as a proxy to estimate predictive uncertainty [46].
B. Interpretability in Machine Learning
It is not only difficult to calibrate DNN predictions to obtain
reliable confidence estimates, but also to present a human
observer with an explanation for model outputs. Answering
the question “Why did the model decide that?” can be a
complex endeavor for DNNs when compared to somewhat
more interpretable models like decision trees (at least trees
that are small enough for a human to understand their decision
process). The ability to explain the logic followed by a model
is also key to debug ML-driven autonomy.
Progress in this area of interpretability for ML (or sometimes
explainable AI), remains limited because the criteria for success
are ill-defined and difficult to quantify [16]. Nevertheless,
legislation like the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation require that companies deploying ML and other
forms of analysis on certain sensitive data provide such
interpretable outputs if the prediction made by a ML model is
used to make decisions without a human in the loop [47]; and
as a result, there is a growing body of literature addressing
interpretability [48], [49], [50], [51], [50], [52], [53], [54].
A by-product of the approach introduced in Section IV is
that it returns exemplar inputs, also called prototypes [55], [56],
to interpret predictions through training points that best explain
the model’s output because they are processed similarly to the
test input considered. This approach to interpretability through
an explanation by example was pioneered by Caruena et al. [57],
who suggested that a comparison of the representation predicted
by a single layer neural network with the representations learned
on its training data would help identify points in the training
data that best explain the prediction made. Among notable
follow-ups [58], [59], [60], this technique was also applied to
visualize relationships learned between words by the word2vec
language model [61]. As detailed in Section IV, we search
for nearest neighboring training points not at the level of the
embedding layer only but at the level of each layer within the
DNN and use the labels of the nearest neighboring training
points to provide confidence, interpretability and robustness.
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Evaluating interpretability is difficult because of the involve-
ment of humans. Doshi-Velez and Kim [25] identify two classes
of evaluation for interpretability: (1) the model is useful for a
practical (and perhaps simplified) application used as a proxy to
test interpretability [50], [62], [49] or (2) the model is learned
using a specific hypothesis class already established to be
interpretable (e.g., a sparse linear model or a decision tree) [63].
Our evaluation falls under the first category: exemplars returned
by our model simplify downstream practical applications.
C. Robustness in Machine Learning
The lack of confidence and interpretability of DNN outputs is
also illustrated by adversarial examples: models make mistake
on these malicious inputs, yet their confidence is often higher
in the mistake than when predicting on a legitimate input.
Adversarial examples are malicious test inputs obtained by
perturbing legitimate inputs [17], [23], [64], [65], [66], [67],
[68], [69], [70]. Despite the inputs being originally correctly
classified, the perturbation added to craft an adversarial example
changes the output of a model. In computer vision applications,
because the perturbation added is so small in the pixel space,
humans are typically unaffected: adversarial images are visually
indistinguishable [17]. This not only shows that ML models
lack robustness to perturbations of their inputs, but also again
that their predictions lack human interpretability.
Learning models robust to adversarial examples is a challeng-
ing task. Defining robustness is difficult, and the community has
resorted to optimizing for robustness in a `p norm ball around
the training data (i.e., making sure that the model’s predictions
are constant in a neighborhood of each training point defined
using a lp norm). Progress has been made by discretizing
the input space [71], training on adversarial examples [72],
[18] or attempting to remove the adversarial perturbation [73],
[74]. Using robust optimization would be ideal but is difficult—
often intractable—in practice because rigorous definitions of
the input domain region that adversarial examples make up
are often non-convex and thus difficult to optimize for. Recent
investigations showed that a convex region that includes this
non-convex region defined by adversarial examples can be used
to upper bound the potential loss inflicted by adversaries and
thus perform robust optimization over it. Specifically, robust
optimization is performed over a convex polytope that includes
the non-convex space of adversarial examples [75], [76].
Following the analysis of Szegedy et al. [17] suggesting that
each layer of a neural network has large Lipschitz constants,
there has been several attempts at making the representations
better behaved, i.e., to prove small Lipschitz constants per layer,
which would imply robustness to adversarial perturbations:
small changes to the input of a layer would be guaranteed to
produce bounded changes to the output of said layer. However,
techniques proposed have either restricted the ability to train a
neural network (e.g., RBF units [64]) or demonstrated marginal
improvements in robustness (e.g., Parseval networks [77]).
The approach introduced in Section IV instead uses a nearest
neighbors operation to ensure representations output by layers
at test time are consistent with those learned during training.
IV. DEEP K-NEAREST NEIGHBORS ALGORITHM
The approach we introduce takes a DNN trained using any
standard DNN learning algorithm and modifies the procedure
followed to have the model predict on test data: patterns
identified in the data at test time by internal components (i.e.,
layers) of the DNN are compared to those found during training
to ensure that any prediction made is supported by the training
data. Hence, rather than treating the model as a black-box and
trusting its predictions obliviously, our inference procedures
ensures that each intermediate computation performed by the
DNN is consistent with its final output—the label prediction.
The pseudo-code for our Deep k-Nearest Neighbors (DkNN)
procedure is presented in Algorithm 1. We first motivate
why analyzing representations internal to the deep neural
network (DNN) that underlies it allows the DkNN algorithm to
strengthen the interpretability and robustness of its predictions.
This is the object of Section IV-A. Then, in Section IV-B, we
inscribe our algorithm in the framework of conformal prediction
to estimate and calibrate the confidence of DkNN predictions.
The confidence, interpretability and robustness of the DkNN are
empirically evaluated respectively in Sections V, VI and VII.
A. Predicting with Neighboring Representations
1) Motivation: As we described in Section II, DNNs learn a
hierarchical set of representations. In other words, they project
the input in increasingly abstract spaces, and eventually in
a space where the classification decision can be made using
a logistic regression—which is the role of the softmax layer
typically used as the last layer of neural network classifiers (see
Section III-A). In many cases, this hierarchy of representations
enables DNNs to generalize well on data presented to the model
at test time. However, phenomena like adversarial examples—
especially those produced by feature adversaries [33], which we
cover extensively in Section VII-C—or the lack of invariance to
translations [78] indicate that representations learned by DNNs
are not as robust as the technical community initially expected.
Because DNN training algorithms make the implicit assumption
that test data is drawn from the same distribution than training
data, this has not been an obstacle to most developments of ML.
However, when one wishes to deploy ML in settings where
safety or security are critical, it becomes necessary to invent
mechanisms suitable to identify when the model is extrapolating
too much from the representations it has built with its training
data. Hence, the first component of our approach analyzes these
internal representations at test time to detect inconsistencies
with patterns analyzed in the training data.
Briefly put, our goal is to ensure that each intermediate
computation performed by the deep neural network is conformal
with the final prediction it makes. Naturally, we rely on the
layered structure afforded by DNNs to define these intermediate
computation checks. Indeed, each hidden layer, internal to the
DNN, outputs a different representation of the input presented
to the model. Each layer builds on the representation output by
the layer that precedes it to compute its own representation of
the input. When the final layer of a DNN indicates that the input
should be classified in a particular class, it outputs in a way
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Algorithm 1 – Deep k-Nearest Neighbor.
Input: training data (X,Y ), calibration data (Xc, Y c)
Input: trained neural network f with l layers
Input: number k of neighbors
Input: test input z
1: // Compute layer-wise k nearest neighbors for test input z
2: for each layer λ ∈ 1 .. l do
3: Γ← k points in X closest to z found w/ LSH tables
4: Ωλ ← {Yi : i ∈ Γ} . Labels of k inputs found
5: end for
6: // Compute prediction, confidence and credibility
7: A = {α(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ (Xc, Y c)} . Calibration
8: for each label j ∈ 1..n do
9: α(z, j)←∑λ∈1..l |i ∈ Ωλ : i 6= j| . Nonconformity
10: pj(z) =
|{α∈A:α≥α(z,j)}|
|A| . empirical p-value
11: end for
12: prediction ← arg maxj∈1..n pj(z)
13: confidence ← 1−maxj∈1..n,j 6=prediction pj(z)
14: credibility ← maxj∈1..n pj(z)
15: return prediction, confidence, credibility
an abstract representation of the input which is the class itself.
This representation is computed based on the representation
output by the penultimate layer, which itself must have been
characteristic of inputs from this particular class. The same
reasoning can be recursively applied to all layers of the DNN
until one reaches the input layer, i.e., the input itself.
In the event where a DNN mistakenly predicts the wrong
class for an input, there is necessarily one of its layers that
transformed the input’s representation, which was by definition
in the correct class initially because the input is itself a
representation in the input domain, into a representation that
is closer to inputs from the wrong class eventually predicted
by the DNN. This behavior, depicted in Figure 1, is what our
approach sets out to algorithmically characterize to make DNN
predictions more confident, interpretable and robust.
2) A nearest neighbors approach: In its simplest form, our
approach (see Figure 1) can be understood as creating a nearest
neighbors classifiers in the space defined by each DNN layer.
While prior work has considered fitting linear classifiers [51] or
support vector machines [79], we chose the nearest neighbors
because it explicits the relationship between predictions made
by the model and its training data. We later leverage this aspect
to characterize the nonconformity of model predictions.
Once the neural network f has been trained, we record the
output of its layers fλ for λ ∈ 1..l on each of its training
points. For each layer λ, we thus have a representation of
the training data along with the corresponding labels, which
allows us to construct a nearest neighbors classifier. Because
the output of layers is often high-dimensional (e.g., the first
layers of DNNs considered in our experiments have tens
of thousands of neuron activations), we use the algorithm
of Andoni et al. [80] to efficiently perform the lookup of
nearest neighboring representations in the high-dimensional
spaces learned by DNN layers. It implements data-dependent
locality-sensitive hashing [81], [82] to find nearest neighbors
according to the cosine similarity between vectors. Locality-
sensitive hashing (LSH) functions differ from cryptographic
hash functions; they are designed to maximize the collision
of similar items. This property is beneficial to the nearest
neighbors problem in high dimensions. Given a query point,
locality-sensitive hashing functions are first used to establish
a list of candidate nearest neighbors: these are points that
collide (i.e., are similar) with the query point. Then, the nearest
neighbors can be found among this set of candidate points. In
short, when we are presented with a test input x:
1) We run input x through the DNN f to obtain the l
representations output by its layers: {fλ(x) | λ ∈ 1..l}
2) For each of these representations fλ(x), we use a nearest
neighbors classifier based on locality-sensitive hashing to
find the k training points whose representations at layer
λ are closest to the one of the test input (i.e., fλ(x)).
3) For each layer λ, we collect the multi-set Ωλ of
labels assigned in the training dataset to the k nearest
representations found at the previous step.
4) We use all multi-sets Ωλ to compute the prediction of
our DkNN according to the framework of conformal
prediction (see Section IV-B).
The comparison of representations predicted by the DNN
at test time with neighboring representations learned during
training allows us to make progress towards providing certain
desirable properties for DNNs such as interpretability and ro-
bustness. Indeed, we demonstrate in Section VI that the nearest
neighbors offer a form of natural—and most importantly human
interpretable—explanations for the intermediate computations
performed by the DNN at each of its layers. Furthermore, in
order to manipulate the predictions of our DkNN algorithm with
malicious inputs like adversarial examples, adversaries have to
force inputs to closely align with representations learned from
the training data by all layers of the underlying DNN. Because
the first layers learn low-level features and the adversary is no
longer able to exploit non-linearities to gradually change the
representation of an input from the correct class to the wrong
class, it becomes harder to produce adversarial examples with
perturbations that don’t change the semantics (and label) of the
input. We validate these claims in Section VII but first present
the second component of our approach, from which stem our
predictions and their calibrated confidence estimates.
B. Conformal Predictions for DkNN Confidence Estimation
Estimating DNN confidence is difficult, and often an obstacle
to their deployment (e.g., in medical applications or security-
critical settings). Literature surveyed in Section II and our
experience concludes that probabilities output by the softmax
layer and commonly used as a proxy for DNN confidence are
not well calibrated [15]. In particular, they often overestimate
the model’s confidence when making predictions on inputs that
fall outside the training distribution (see Section V-C for an
empirical evaluation). Here, we leverage ideas from conformal
prediction and the nearest neighboring representations central
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to the DkNN algorithm to define how it makes predictions
accompanied with confidence and credibility estimates. While
confidence indicates how likely the prediction is to be correct
according to the model’s training set, credibility quantifies how
relevant the training set is to make this prediction. Later, we
demonstrate experimentally that credibility is well calibrated
when the DkNN predicts in both benign (Section V) and
adversarial (Section VII) environments.
1) Inductive Conformal Prediction: Conformal prediction
builds on an existing ML classifier to provide a probabilistically
valid measure of confidence and credibility for predictions
made by the underlying classifier [19], [20], [24]. In its
original variant, which we don’t describe here in the interest
of space, conformal prediction required that the underlying
classifier be trained from scratch for each test input. This
cost would be prohibitive in our case, because the underlying
ML classifier is a DNN. Thus, we use an inductive variant of
conformal prediction [83], [84] that does not require retraining
the underlying classifier for each query because it assumes
the existence of a calibration set—holdout data that does not
overlap with the training or test data.
Essential to all forms of, including inductive, conformal
prediction is the existence of a nonconformity measure, which
indicates how different a labeled input is from previous obser-
vations of samples from the data distribution. Nonconformity
is typically measured with the underlying machine learning
classifier. In our case, we would like to measure how different
a test input with a candidate label is from previous labeled
inputs that make up the training data. In essence, this is one
of the motivations of the DkNN. For this reason, a natural
proxy for the nonconformity of a labeled input is the number
of nearest neighboring representations found by the DkNN in
its training data whose label is different from the candidate
label. When this number is low, there is stronger support for
the candidate label assigned to the test input in the training
data modeled by the DkNN. Instead, when this number is high,
the DkNN was not able to find training points that support
the candidate label, which is likely to be wrong. In our case,
nonconformity of an input x with the label j is defined as:
α(x, j) =
∑
λ∈1..l
|i ∈ Ωλ : i 6= j| (3)
where Ωλ is the multi-set of labels for the training points whose
representations are closest to the test input’s at layer λ.
Before inference can begin and predictions made on un-
labeled test inputs, we compute the nonconformity of the
calibration dataset (Xc, Y c), which is labeled. The calibration
data is sampled from the same distribution than training
data but is not used to train the model. The size of this
calibration set should strike a balance between reducing the
number of points that need to be heldout from training
or test datasets and increasing the precision of empirical
p-values computed (see below) Let us denote with A the
nonconformity values computed on the set of calibration data,
that is A = {α(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ (Xc, Y c)}.
Once all of these values are computed, the nonconformity
score of a test input is compared with the scores computed on
the calibration dataset through a form of hypothesis testing.
Specifically, given a test input x, we perform the following for
each candidate label j ∈ 1..n:
1) We use neighbors identified by the DkNN and Equation 3
to compute the nonconformity α(x, j) where x is the
test input and j the candidate label.
2) We calculate the fraction of nonconformity measures for
the calibration data that are larger than the test input’s.
This is the empirical p-value of candidate label j:
pj(x) =
|{α ∈ A : α ≥ α(x, j)}|
|A| (4)
The predicted label for the test input is the one assigned the
largest empirical p-value, i.e., arg maxj∈1..n pj(x). Although
two classes could be assigned identical empirical p-values, this
does not happen often in practice. The prediction’s confidence
is set to 1 minus the second largest empirical p-value. Indeed,
this quantity is the probability that any label other than the
prediction is the true label. Finally, the prediction’s credibility
is the empirical p-value of the prediction: it bounds the
nonconformity of any label assigned to the test input with the
training data. In our experiments, we are primarily interested
in the second metric, credibility.
Overall, the approach described in this Section yields the
inference procedure outline in Algorithm 1.
V. EVALUATION OF THE CONFIDENCE OF DKNNS
The DkNN leverages nearest neighboring representations
in the training data to define the nonconformity of individual
predictions. Recall that in Section IV, we applied the framework
of conformal prediction to define two notions of what com-
monly falls under the realm of “confidence”: confidence and
credibility. In our experiments, we measured high confidence
on a large majority of inputs. In other words, the nonconformity
of the runner-up candidate label is high, making it unlikely—
according to the training data—that this second label be the
true answer. However, we observe that credibility varies across
both in- and out-of-distribution samples.
Because our primary interest is the support (or lack of
thereof) that training data gives to DkNN predictions, which is
precisely what credibility characterizes, we tailor our evaluation
to demonstrate that credibility is well-calibrated, i.e., identifies
predictions not supported by the training data. For instance,
we validate the low credibility of DkNN predictions on out-
of-distribution inputs. Here, all experiments are conducted
in benign settings, whereas an evaluation of the DkNN in
adversarial settings is found later in Section VII.
A. Experimental setup
We experiment with three datasets. First, the handwritten
recognition task of MNIST is a classic ML benchmark: inputs
are grayscale images of zip-code digits written on postal mail
and the task classes (i.e., the model’s expected output), digits
from 0 to 9 [85]. Due to artifacts it possesses, e.g., redundant
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Dataset DNN Accuracy DkNN Accuracy
MNIST 99.2% 99.1%
SVHN 90.6% 90.9%
GTSRB 93.4% 93.6%
TABLE I: Classification accuracy of the DNN and DkNN:
the DkNN has a limited impact on or improves performance.
features, we use MNIST as a “unit test” to validate our DkNN
implementation. Second, the SVHN dataset is another seminal
benchmark collected by Google Street View: inputs are colored
images of house numbers and classes, digits from 0 to 9 [86].
This task is harder than MNIST because inputs are not as well
pre-processed: e.g., images in the same class have different
colors and light conditions. Third, the GTSRB dataset is a
collection of traffic sign images to be classified in 43 classes
(each class corresponds to a type of traffic sign) [87]. For all
datasets, we use a DNN that stacks convolutionnal layers with
one or more fully connected layers. Specific architectures used
for each of the three datasets are detailed in the Appendix.
For each model, we implement the DkNN classifier described
in Algorithm 1. We use a grid parameter search to set the
number of neighbors k = 75 and the size (750 for MNIST and
SVHN, 850 for GTSRB because the task has more classes)
of the calibration set, which is obtained by holding out a
subset of the test data not used for evaluation. Table I offers
a comparison of classification accuracies for the DNN and
DkNN. The impact of the DkNN on performance is minimal
when it does not improve performance (i.e., increase accuracy).
B. Credibility on in-distribution samples
Given that there exists no ground-truth for the credibility of a
prediction, qualitative or quantitative evaluations of credibility
estimates is often difficult. Indeed, datasets include the true
label along with training and test inputs but do not indicate the
expected credibility of a model on these inputs. Furthermore,
these inputs may for instance present some ambiguities and as
such make 100% credibility a non-desirable outcome.
One way to characterize well-behaved credibility estimates is
that they should truthfully convey the likelihood of a prediction
being correct: high confident predictions should almost always
be correct and low confident predictions almost always wrong.
Hence, we plot reliability diagrams to visualize the calibration
of our credibility [88]. They are histograms presenting accuracy
as a function of credibility estimates. Given a set of test points
(X,Y ), we group them in bins (Xab, Yab). A point (x, y)
is placed in bin (Xab, Yab) if the model’s credibility on x is
contained in the interval [a, b). Each bin is assigned the model’s
mean accuracy as its value:
bin(a, b) :=
1
|Xab|
∑
(x,y)∈(Xab,Yab)
1f(x)=y (5)
Ideally, the credibility of a well-calibrated model should in-
crease linearly with the accuracy of predictions, i.e., the reliabil-
ity diagram should approach a linear function: bin(a, b) ' a+b2 .
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Fig. 2: Reliability diagrams of DNN softmax confidence
(left) and DkNN credibility (right) on test data—bars (left
axis) indicate the mean accuracy of predictions binned by
credibility; the red line (right axis) illustrates data density
across bins. The softmax outputs high confidence on most of
the data while DkNN credibility spreads across the value range.
Reliability diagrams are plotted for the MNIST, SVHN
and GTSRB dataset in Figure 2. On the left, they visualize
confidence estimates output by the DNN softmax; that is the
probability arg maxj fj(x) assigned to the most likely class.
On the right, they plot the credibility of DkNN predictions, as
defined in Section IV. At first, it may appear that the softmax
is better calibrated than its DkNN counterpart: its reliability
diagrams are closer to the linear relation between accuracy
and DNN confidence. However, if one takes into account the
distribution of DkNN credibility values across the test data
(i.e., the number of test points found in each credibility bin
reflected by the red line overlaid on the bars), it surfaces
that the softmax is almost always very confident on test data
with a confidence above 0.8. Instead, the DkNN uses the
range of possible credibility values for datasets like SVHN,
whose test set contains a larger number of inputs that are
difficult to classify (reflected by the lower mean accuracy of the
underlying DNN). We will see how this behavior is beneficial
when processing out-of-distribution samples in Section V-C
below and adversarial examples later in Section VII.
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Fig. 3: Mislabeled inputs from the MNIST (top) and SVHN
(bottom) test sets: we found these points by searching for
inputs that are classified with strong credibility by the DkNN
in a class that is different than the label found in the dataset.
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Fig. 4: DkNN credibility vs. softmax confidence on out-
of-distribution test data: the lower credibility of DkNN
predictions (solid lines) compared to the softmax confidence
(dotted lines) is desirable here because test inputs are not part
of the distribution on which the model was trained—they are
from another dataset or created by rotating inputs.
In addition,the credibility output by the DkNN provides
insights into the test data itself. For instance, we find that
credibility is sufficiently reliable to find test inputs whose label
in the original dataset is wrong. In both the MNIST and SVHN
test sets, we looked for images that were were assigned a high
credibility estimate by the DkNN for a label that did not match
the one found in the dataset: i.e., the DkNN “mispredicted”
the input’s class according to the label included in the dataset.
Figure 3 depicts some of the images returned by this heuristic.
It is clear for all of them that the dataset label is either wrong
(e.g., the MNIST 4 labeled as a 9 and SVHN 5 labeled as a 1)
or ambiguous (e.g., the penultimate MNIST image is likely to
be a 5 corrected into a 0 by the person who wrote it, and two
of the SVHN images were assigned the label of the digit that
is cropped on the left of the digit that is in the center). We
were not able to find mislabeled inputs in the GTSRB dataset.
C. Credibility on out-of-distribution samples
We now validate the DkNN’s prediction credibility on out-
of-distribution samples. Inputs considered in this experiment
are either from a different classification task (i.e., drawn from
another distribution) or generated by applying geometrical
transformations to inputs sampled from the distribution. Due to
the absence of support for these inputs in our training manifold,
we expect the DkNN’s credibility to be low on these inputs:
the training data used to learn the model is not relevant to
classify the test inputs we ask the model to classify.
For MNIST, the first set of out-of-distribution samples
contains images from the NotMNIST dataset, which are images
of unicode characters rendered using computer fonts [89].
Images from NotMNIST have an identical format to MNIST
but the classes are non-overlapping: none of the classes from
MNIST (digits from 0 to 9) are included in the NotMNIST
dataset (letters from A to J) and vice-versa. For SVHN, the
analog set of out-of-distribution samples contains images from
the CIFAR-10 dataset: they have the same format but again
there is no overlap between SVHN and the objects and animals
from CIFAR-10 [90]. For both the MNIST and SVHN datasets,
we rotate all test inputs by an angle of 45◦ to generate a second
set of out-of-distribution samples. Indeed, despite the presence
of convolutional layers to encourage invariance to geometrical
transformations, DNNs poorly classify rotated data unless they
are explicitly trained on examples of such rotated inputs [78].
The credibility of the DkNN on these out-of-distribution
samples is compared with the probabilities predicted by the
underlying DNN softmax on MNIST (left) and SVHN (right) in
Figure 4. The DkNN algorithm assigns an average credibility
of 6% and 9% to inputs from the NotMNIST and rotated
MNIST test sets respectively, compared to 33% and 31% for
the softmax probabilities. Similar observations hold for the
SVHN model: the DkNN assigns a mean credibility of 15%
and 18% to CIFAR-10 and rotated SVHN inputs, in contrast
with 52% and 33% for the softmax probabilities.
Take-away 5.1: DkNN credibility is better calibrated
on out-of-distribution samples than softmax probabilities:
outliers to the training distribution are assigned low
credibility reflecting a lack of support from training data.
Again, we tested here the DkNN only on “benign” out-of-
distribution samples. Later, we make similar observations when
evaluating the DkNN on adversarial examples in Section VII.
VI. EVALUATION OF THE INTERPRETABILITY OF DKNNS
The internal logic of DNNs is often controlled by a large set
of parameters, as is the case in our experiments, and is thus
difficult to understand for a human observer. Instead, the nearest
neighbors central to the DkNN are an instance of explanations
by example [57]. Training points whose representations are
near the test input’s representation afford evidence relevant for
a human observer to rationalize the DNN’s prediction. Further-
more, research from the neuroscience community suggests that
locality-sensitivity hashing, the technique used in Section IV)
to find nearest neighbors in the DkNN, may be a general
principle of computation in the brain [91], [92].
Defining interpretability is difficult and we thus follow one
of the evaluation methods outlined by Doshi and Kim [25]. We
demonstrate interpretability through a downstream practical
application of the DkNN: fairness in ML [93].
Machine learning models reflect human biases, such as the
ones encoded in their training data, which raises concerns about
their lack of fairness towards minorities [94], [95], [96], [97],
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Prediction: Racket (49%)Prediction: Basketball (68%)
Fig. 5: Debugging ResNet model biases—This illustrates how
the DkNN algorithm helps to understand a bias identified by
Stock and Cisse´ [105] in the ResNet model for ImageNet. The
image at the bottom of each column is the test input presented
to the DkNN. Each test input is cropped slightly differently to
include (left) or exclude (right) the football. Images shown at
the top are nearest neighbors in the predicted class according
to the representation output by the last hidden layer. This
comparison suggests that the “basketball” prediction may have
been a consequence of the ball being in the picture. Also
note how the white apparel color and general arm positions of
players often match the test image of Barack Obama.
[98], [99], [100]. This is for instance undesirable when the
model’s predictions are used to make decisions or influence
humans that are taking them: e.g., admitting a student to
university [101], predicting if a defendant awaiting trial can
be released safely [102], modeling consumer credit risk [103].
We show that nearest neighbors identified by the DkNN help
understand how training data yields model biases. This is a
step towards eliminating sources of bias during DNN training.
Here, we consider model bias to the skin color of a person.
Models for computer vision potentially exhibit bias towards
people of dark skin [104]. In a recent study, Stock and Cisse´
[105] demonstrate how an image of former US president
Barack Obama throwing an American football in a stadium
(see Figure 5) is classified as a basketball by a popular model
for computer vision—a residual neural network (ResNet [106]).
In the following, we reproduce their experiment and apply
the DkNN algorithm to this architecture to provide explanations
by example of the prediction made on this input. To do so,
we downloaded the pre-trained model from the TensorFlow
repository [107], as well as the ImageNet training dataset [13].
We plot the 10 nearest neighbors from the training data for
the class predicted by the model in Figure 5. These neighbors
are computed using the representation output by the last hidden
layer of the ResNet model. On the left, the test image that is
processed by the DNN is the same than the one used by Stock
and Cisse´ [105]. Its neighbors in the training data are images
of 7 black and 3 white basketball players (female and male).
Note how the basketball is similar in appearance to the football
in the image of Obama: it is of similar color and located in the
air (often towards the top of the image). Hence, we conjecture
that the ball may play an important factor in the prediction.
We repeat the experiment with the same image cropped
to remove the football (see Figure 5, right). The prediction
changes to racket. Neighbors in this new training class are all
white (female and male) tennis players. Here again, images
share several characteristics of the test image: most noticeably
the background is always green (and a lawn) but also more
subtly the player is dressed in white and holding one of her or
his hands in the air. While this does not necessarily contradict
the bias identified in prior work, it offers alternative—perhaps
complementary—explanations for the prediction made by the
model. In this particular example, in addition to the skin color
of Barack Obama, the position and appearance of the football
contributed to the model’s original basketball prediction.
The simplicity of the heuristic suggests that beyond imme-
diate benefits for human trust in deep learning, techniques that
enable interpretability—like the DkNN—will make powerful
debugging tools for deep learning practitioners to better identify
the limitations of their algorithms and models in a semi-
automated way [52]. This heuristic also suggests steps towards
eliminating bias in DNN training. For instance, one could
remove ambiguous training points or add new points to prevent
the model from learning an undesired correlation between a
feature of the input (e.g., skin color) and one of the class labels
(e.g., a sport). In the interest of space, we leave a more detailed
exploration of this aspect to future work.
VII. EVALUATION OF THE ROBUSTNESS OF DKNNS
The lack of robustness to perturbations of their inputs is a
major criticism faced by DNNs. Like other ML techniques,
deep learning is for instance vulnerable to adversarial examples.
Defending against these malicious inputs is difficult because
DNNs extrapolate with too much confidence from their training
data (as we reported in Section V-C). To illustrate, consider
the example of adversarial training [17], [64]. The resulting
models are robust to some classes of attacks because they are
trained on inputs generated by these attacks during training but
they remain vulnerable to adapted strategies [18]. In a direction
orthogonal to defenses like adversarial training, which attempt
to have the model always output a correct prediction, we
show here that the DkNN is a step towards correctly handling
malicious inputs like adversarial examples because it:
• outputs more reliable confidence estimates on adversarial
examples than the softmax (Section VII-A)
• provides insights as to why adversarial examples affect
undefended DNNs. In the applications considered, they tar-
get the layers that automate feature extraction to introduce
ambiguity that eventually builds up to significantly change
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Dataset Attack Attack Parameters DNN DkNN
MNIST
FGSM ε=0.25 27.1% 54.9%
BIM ε=0.25, α=0.01, i=100 0.7% 16.8%
CW κ=0, c=10−4, i=2000 0.7% 94.4%
SVHN
FGSM ε = 0.05 9.3% 28.6%
BIM ε=0.05, α=0.005, i=20 4.7% 17.9%
CW κ=0, c=10−4, i=2000 4.7% 80.5%
GTSRB
FGSM ε = 0.1 12.3% 22.3%
BIM ε=0.1, α=0.005, i=20 6.5% 13.6%
CW κ=0, c=10−4, i=2000 3.0% 74.5%
TABLE II: Adversarial example classification accuracy for
the DNN and DkNN: attack parameters are chosen according
to prior work. All input features were clipped to remain in their
range. Note that most wrong predictions made by the DkNN
are assigned low credibility (see Figure 6 and the Appendix).
the end prediction of the model despite the perturbation
magnitude being small in the input domain (Section VII-B)
• is robust to adaptive attacks we considered, which modify
the input to align its internal representations with the ones
of training points from a class that differs from the correct
class of the input (see Section VII-C)
A. Identifying Adversarial Examples with the DkNN Algorithm
In Section V, we found that outliers to the training dis-
tribution modeled by a DNN could be identified at test
time by ensuring that the model’s internal representations
are neighbored in majority by training points whose labels
are consistent with the prediction. This is achieved by the
conformal prediction stage of the DkNN. Here, we show that
this technique is also applicable to detect malicious inputs:
e.g., adversarial examples. In practice, we find that the DkNN
algorithm yields well-calibrated responses on these adversarial
inputs—meaning that the DkNN assigns low credibility to
adversarial examples unless it can recover their correct class.
We craft adversarial examples using three representative
algorithms: the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [64], the
Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [108], and the Carlini-Wagner
`2 attack (CW) [69]. Parameters specific to each attack are
reported in Table II. We also include the accuracy of both the
undefended DNN and the DkNN algorithm on these inputs.
From this, we conclude that even though attacks successfully
evade the undefended DNN, when this DNN is integrated with
the DkNN inference algorithm, some accuracy on adversarial
examples is recovered because the first layers of the DNN
output representations on adversarial examples whose neighbors
in the training data are in the original class (the true class of
the image from which adversarial examples are crafted).
We will come back to this aspect in Section VII-B and
conclude that the ambiguity introduced by adversarial examples
is marked by a large multi-set of candidate labels in the
first layers compared to non-adversarial inputs. However,
the DkNN’s error rate remains high, despite the improved
performance with respect to the underlying DNN. We now
turn to the credibility of these predictions, which we left out
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Fig. 6: Reliability Diagrams on Adversarial Examples—
The DkNN’s credibility is better calibrated (i.e., it assigns low
confidence to adversarial examples) than probabilities output by
the softmax of an undefended DNN. All diagrams are plotted
with GTSRB test data. Similar graphs for the MNIST and
SVHN datasets are in the Appendix.
of consideration until now, and show that because the DkNN’s
credibility on these inputs is low, they can largely be identified.
In Figure 6, we plot reliability diagrams comparing the
DkNN credibility on GTSRB adversarial examples with the
softmax probabilities output by the DNN. Similar graphs for
the MNIST and SVHN datasets are found in the Appendix.
Credibility is low across all attacks for the DkNN, when
compared to legitimate test points considered in Section V—
unless the DkNN’s predicted label is correct as indicated by
the quasi-linear diagrams. Recall that the number of points in
each bin is reflected by the red line. Hence, the DkNN outputs
a credibility below 0.5 for most inputs because predictions on
adversarial examples are not conformal with pairs of inputs
and labels found in the training data. This behavior is a sharp
departure from softmax probabilities, which classified most
adversarial examples in the wrong class with a confidence often
above 0.9 for the FGSM and BIM attacks. We also observe
that the BIM attack is more successful than the FGSM or
the CW attacks at introducing perturbations that mislead the
DkNN inference procedure. We hypothesize that it outputs
adversarial examples that encode some characteristics of the
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Fig. 7: Number of Candidate Labels among k = 75 Nearest
Neighboring Representations—Shown for GTSRB with clean
and adversarial data across the layers of the DNN underlying
the DkNN. Points are centered according to the number of
labels found in the neighbors; while the area of points is
proportional to the number of neighbors whose label matches
the DNN prediction. Representations output by lower layers
of the DNN are less ambiguous for clean data than adversarial
examples (nearest neighbors are more homogeneously labeled).
wrong class, which would also explain its previously observed
strong transferability across models [108], [66], [18].
Take-away 7.1: DkNN credibility is better calibrated
than softmax probabilities. When the DkNN outputs a
prediction with high credibility, this often implies the true
label of an adversarial example was recovered.
We conclude that the good performance of credibility esti-
mates on benign out-of-distribution data observed in Section V
is also applicable to adversarial test data considered here. The
DkNN degrades its confidence smoothly as adversarial exam-
ples push its inputs from legitimate points to the underlying
DNN’s error region. It is even able to recover some of the true
labels of adversarial examples when the number of nearest
neighboring representations in that class is sufficiently large.
B. Explaining DNN Mispredictions on Adversarial Examples
Nearest neighboring representations offer insights into why
DNNs are vulnerable to small perturbations introduced by ad-
versarial examples. We find that adversarial examples gradually
exploit poor generalization as they are successively processed
by each layer of the DNN: small perturbations are able to
have a large impact on the model’s output because of the non-
linearities applied by each of its layers. Recall Figure 1, where
we illustrated how this behavior is reflected by neighboring
representations, which gradually change from being in the
correct class—the one of the corresponding unperturbed test
input—to the wrong class assigned to the adversarial example.
To illustrate this, we analyze the labels of the k = 75
nearest neighboring training representations for each layer
when predicting on adversarial data. We expect this number
to be larger for adversarial examples than for their legitimate
counterpart because this ambiguity would ultimately lead to
the model making a mistake. This is what we observe in
Figure 7. For both clean and adversarial examples, the number
of candidate labels (i.e., the multi-set of labels for the k training
points with nearest neighboring representations) decreases as
we move up the neural architecture from its input layer towards
its output layer: the model is projecting the input in increasingly
more abstract spaces that are better suited to classify the input.
However, adversarial examples have more candidate labels for
lower layers than legitimate inputs: they introduce ambiguity
that is later responsible for the model’s mistake.
In addition, the number of candidate labels (those of the k =
75 nearest neighboring training representations) that match the
final prediction made by the DNN is smaller for some attacks
compared to other attacks, and for all attacks compared to
legitimate inputs. This is particularly the case for the CW attack,
which is likely the reason why the true label of adversarial
examples it produces is often recovered by the DkNN (see
Table II). Again, this lack of conformity between neighboring
representations at different layers explicitly characterizes weak
support for the model’s prediction in its training data.
Take-away 7.2: Nearest neighbors provide a new avenue
for measuring the strength of an attack: if an adversarial
example is able to force many of the k nearest neighboring
representations to have labels in the wrong class eventually
predicted by the model, it is less likely to be detected
(e.g., by a DkNN or other techniques that may appear in
the future) and also more likely to transfer across models.
Targeting internal representations of the DNN is the object
of Section VII-C, where we consider such an adaptive attack
that targets the internal representation of the DNN.
C. Robustness of the DkNN Algorithm to Adaptive Attacks
Our experimental results suggest that we should not only
study the vulnerability of DNNs as a whole, but also at the level
of their hidden layers. This is the goal of feature adversaries
introduced by Sabour et al. [33]. Rather than forcing a model
to misclassify, these adversaries produce adversarial examples
that force a DNN to output an internal representation that is
close to the one it outputs on a guide input. Conceptually, this
attack may be deployed for any of the hidden layers that make
up modern DNNs. For instance, if the adversary is interested in
attacking layer l, it solves the following optimization problem:
x∗ = arg min
x
‖fl(x)− fl(x∗)‖ s.t. ‖x− x∗‖ ≤ ε (6)
where the norm is typically chosen to be the `∞ norm.
This strategy is a natural candidate for an adaptive attack
against our DkNN classification algorithm. An adversary aware
that the defender is using the DkNN algorithm to strengthen the
robustness of its predictive model needs to produce adversarial
examples that are not only (a) misclassified by the DNN that
underlies the DkNN algorithm but also (b) closely aligned with
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Fig. 8: Feature Adversarial Examples against our DkNN
algorithm—Shown for SVHN (see Appendix for MNIST).
Adversarial examples are organized according to their original
label (rows) and the DkNN’s prediction (columns).
internal representations of the training data for the class that
the DNN is mistakenly classifying the adversarial example in.
Hence, we evaluate the DkNN against feature adversaries. We
assume a strong, perhaps insider, adversary with knowledge
of the training set used by the defender. This ensures that
we consider the worst-case setting for deploying our DkNN
algorithm and not rely on security by obscurity [109].
Specifically, given a test point x, we target the first layer
l = 1 analyzed by the DkNN, e.g., the output of the first
convolutional layer in our experiments on MNIST and SVHN.
In our feature adversaries attack, we let the guide input be
the input from a different class whose representation at layer
l = 1 is closest from the input we are attempting to attack. This
heuristic returns a guide input that is already semantically close
to the input being attacked, making it easier to find smaller
pertubations in the input domain (here, the pixel domain) that
forces the predicted representation of the input being attacked
to match the representation of the guide input. We then run
the attack proposed by Sabour et al. [33] to find an adversarial
input according to this guide and n test the prediction of our
DkNN when it is presented with the adversarial input.
Figure 8 shows a set of adversarial images selected according
to their order of appearance SVHN test set (a similar figure
for MNIST is found in the Appendix). Images are laid out
on the grid such that the rows indicate the class they were
originally from (that is the correct class for the input that was
attacked) and columns correspond to the model’s prediction on
the adversarial image. Although the adversarial images depicted
evade our DkNN algorithm in the sense that the images are not
classified in the class of the original input they were computed
from, the perception of a human is also affected significantly:
all images are either ambiguous or modified so much that the
wrong (predicted) class is now drawn in the image. In other
words, when the attack succeeded on MNIST (19.6% of the
inputs at ε = 0.3) and SVHN (70.0% of the inputs at ε = 0.1),
it altered some semantics in order to have the adversarial input’s
representation match the representation of the guide input from
a different class. This can be explained by the fact that the
adversary needs to target the representation output by the first
layer in order to ensure the DkNN algorithm will find nearest
neighbors in the predicted class when analyzing this layer.
The ambiguity of many adversarial images returned by the
feature adversarial attack—together with the small perturbation
in `∞ norm that these images have (0.3 for MNIST and 0.1
for SVHN)—raises some questions about the methodology
commonly followed in the literature to evaluate adversarial
example attacks and defenses. Indeed, the robustness of a
machine learning model for a computer vision application
(e.g., image classification) is often defined as its ability to
constantly predict the same class for all inputs found within
an `p norm ball centered in any of the test set’s inputs. The
existence of inputs that are ambiguous to the human’s visual
system in this ball suggests that we should establish a different
definition of the adversarial space that characterizes human
perception more accurately (perhaps one of the metrics used
to evaluate compression algorithms for instance [110]). Note
that this is not the case in other application domains, such as
adversarial examples for malware detection [111], [6], where
an algorithmic oracle is often available—such as a virtual
machine running the executable as shown in Xu et al. [112].
This suggests that future work should propose new definitions
that not only characterize robustness with respect to inputs at
test time but also in terms of the model’s training data.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced the Deep k-Nearest Neighbors (DkNN)
algorithm, which inspects the internals of a deep neural network
(DNN) at test time to provide confidence, interpretability and
robustness properties. The DkNN algorithm compares layer
representation predictions with the nearest neighbors used to
train the model. The resulting credibility measure assesses
conformance of representation prediction with the training data.
When the training data and prediction are in agreement, the
prediction is likely to be accurate. If the prediction and training
data are not in agreement, then the prediction does not have
the training data support to be credible. This is the case with
inputs that are ambiguous (e.g., some inputs contain multiple
classes or are partly occluded due to imperfect preprocessing)
or were maliciously perturbed by an adversary to produce an
adversarial example. Hence, this characterization of confidence
that spans the hierarchy of representations within of a DNN
ensures the integrity of the model. The neighbors also enable
interpretability of model predictions because they are points in
the input domain that serve as support for the prediction and
are easily understood and interpreted by human observers.
Our findings highlight the benefits of integrating simple
inference procedures as ancillary validation of the predictions
of complex learning algorithms. Such validation is a potentially
new avenue to provide security in machine learning systems.
We anticipate that many open problems at the intersection of
machine learning and security will benefit from this perspective,
including availability and integrity. We are excited to explore
these and other related areas in the near future.
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APPENDIX
A. Model architectures
Models were trained with Adam at a learning rate of 10−3.
Layer Layer Parameters MNIST SVHN GTSRB
Conv 1 64 filters, (8x8), (2x2), same Y Y Y
Conv 2 128 filters, (6x6), (2x2), valid Y Y Y
Conv 3 128 filters, (5x5), (1x1), valid Y Y Y
Linear 200 units N N Y
Linear 10 units Y Y Y
TABLE III: DNN architectures for evaluation: the last three
columns indicate which layers are used for the different datasets.
All architectures were implemented using TensorFlow [107]
and CleverHans [113]. Parameters for convolutions are in the
following order: filters, kernel shape, strides, and padding.
B. Reliability diagrams
We provide here additional reliability diagrams for the
MNIST and GTSRB datasets. The experimental setup used to
generate them is described in Section VII-A, along with an
interpretation of the diagrams.
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Fig. 9: Reliability Diagrams on Adversarial Examples—All
diagrams are for MNIST test data, see Figure 6 for details.
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Fig. 10: Reliability Diagrams on Adversarial Examples—
All diagrams are for SVHN test data, see Figure 6 for details.
C. Analysis of the nearest neighbors
We provide here additional diagrams analyzing the labels
of nearest neighbors found on the clean and adversarial data
for the MNIST and SVHN datasets. The experimental setup
used to generate them is described in Section VII-B.
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Fig. 11: Number of Candidate Labels among the k Near-
est Neighboring Representations—Shown for MNIST. See
Figure 7 for a detailed interpretation.
17
ReLU1 ReLU3 ReLU5 logits
Neural Network Layer
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Ca
nd
id
at
e 
La
be
ls 
am
on
g
 k
 N
ea
re
st
 N
ei
gh
bo
rin
g 
Re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
Clean
FGSM
BIM
CW
Fig. 12: Number of Candidate Labels among the k Near-
est Neighboring Representations—Shown for SVHN. See
Figure 7 for a detailed interpretation.
D. Feature Adversaries
Fig. 13: Feature Adversarial Examples against our DkNN
algorithm—Shown for MNIST (see Figure 8 for details)
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